IC 75-1417 25 March 1975

General Wilson
Distributed Data Bases
24 March memo to you, same subject
this afternoon, emphasized to pt is one of "Distributed Production Data Bases. Semantics in this case are erm "data bases" tends to obscure the major ry commands will be delegated primary cing finished intelligence on the capabilities military forces arrayed against them. This scary proposition. At a minimum, it is likely major differences between EUCOM and the on Warsaw Pact capabilities. More fundationally pears to run directly counter to one of the 947 establishment of a DCI and the CIA
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	Office	Init.	Date	COMMENTS: Untill (15)
3.	D/DCI/IC A	proved Fo	r Release 20	04/03/16i s GIA-RDP80M01:133A000690130005r4efing
2	AD/DCI/IC			paper re the DIA <u>Distributed Data Base</u> (DDB) concept which is to be briefed to CIA and ICS top management on Tuesday, 25 Mar. 75
	PD/Plans	JRe'	·stry	The memorandum reports that DDB is part of the DOD general policy for intelligence, per ASD(I)'s Planning and Programming Guidance for the CDIP.
	MPRRD PRD CPAD			The concept contemplates a broad-scale assignment within the Services and U&S Commands of responsibility for maintaining files on intelligence subjects. Data from files would be available to users via remote terminals and computerized telecommunications nets.
	HUMINT Br. USIB Sec.			Major problems must be solved before this could become an effective reality. They include:
	Sec Comm			- Provision for quality control of products.
	IC Registry	· ·		- Provision for solving multilevel security.
				- Provision for improved telecommunications nets.
ACTIO	ON OFFICE			- Provision for vastly improved data stan-dards.
	ENSE DATE			All of these improvements are complex and thus will require several years at best. They also
	aff receive on offices c		ys - (require much more in the way of resources than the community has been willing to allocate to
				date. Finally, these problems cannot be address to X most effectively except community-wide, not merely DoD-wide.
	(Note: Advanc	e copy di	rect to Ger	neral Wilson) Chm IHC

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DCI/IC 75-1512 24 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilson

SUBJECT:

DIA Concept for Distributed Data Bases

REFERENCES:

(a) Memo dated 17 February 1975 to Secretaries of the Military Departments, C/JCS, D/DIA, DIRNSA, et al., from ASD(I), Subject: Intelligence Annex to the FY 77-81 Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum (PPGM) for the CDIP

- (b) DIA Manual 57-1, General Intelligence Production
- (c) DIA <u>Program Objective Memorandum</u>, FY 1976-FY 1980 (undated) (S)
- 1. Reference (a) states that in executing the general guidance provided therein, and in view of the continued austere funding available for intelligence, the following principles apply:

"The development of the distributed data base concept should be pursued vigorously in order to assure the reduction of management layers and unwarranted duplication of effort, while preserving intelligence production quality." (Para. 4(a), Page 4.)

"Effect the standardization of data bases moving toward accessibility at national as well as departmental and combat command levels." (Para. 4(c), Page 4.)

Reference (c) contains general information on DIA's resources planning. Resources are proposed in Program Element 31021L for "a complete analysis and redesign (of) the existing (DIA) data base system." (page IV-23)

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- 2. Consistent with this guidance, DIA is now internally staffing a proposal for a major revision of reference (b). This proposal would delegate full production responsibility for planned general intelligence products to those producers believed best able to accomplish this work by virtue of mission and capabilities. Included in this proposed delegation is the authority for establishment, maintenance and validation of the single DoD data base for each General Intelligence production subject area by the delegated producer. DIA defines "data base" as all data making up a subject file, including automated data.
- 3. DIA would retain responsibility for DoD's national level General Intelligence production on military capabilities, indications and warnings, estimates, and production of military intelligence in areas of critical national interest. DIA would also retain responsibility for policy guidance, centralized management and standards control. Producing units would be established for geographic and subject areas. DIA would spot review products for quality and periodically would look at production assets, procedures, data bases and schedules in detail.
- 4. The concept is to make tentative delegated production agreements between and among the various elements of the Services and the U&S Commands, beginning as soon as possible. A July 1975 conference is planned to formalize all agreements and to ensure all producers are ready to implement the policy.
- 5. Under these agreements producing units would be responsible for maintaining specified data bases and providing products therefrom for all consumers in accordance with agreed schedules, formats, standards and distribution lists. DIA would review schedules, production commitments, and distribution on a regular basis to resolve differences where necessary. Requirements for scheduled products would continue to be reviewed by DIA and forwarded to the appropriate producer for appropriate action. Requirements for non-scheduled products, especially time sensitive ones, would be levied directly on the producer concerned with a copy to DIA.
- 6. Implications of this policy for the IC Staff, USIB Committees and intelligence agencies outside DoD include the following:
 - a. The delegation of production responsibility can impact on the quality and timeliness of intelligence and products. New arrangements for coordination and review of products may be needed.

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- b. Security policy and procedures will be impacted. The concept that the maintenance of a particular data base is to be assigned to organization "x" and all other organizations with a need-to-know are to look primarily to drawing certain data from "x" implies a very extensive and complex network of agreements and understandings as to security procedures for handling and transmitting classified information. This is far from reality as compared to the worldwide scope of this concept which can involve dozens of organizations serving as hosts for specified files. The USIB role is unclear, but the Security Committee certainly has responsibilities.
- c. Computer telecommunications networks will be required. DIA has been working to develop its Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (WICS) but this is still in a relatively early stage. Other communications interfaces are involved, such as COINS, WWMCCS and interfaces with CIA, NSA, State, etc. USIB should be concerned with some overview of these problems, and they fall within the normal scope of the USIB/IHC.
- A major unresolved issue relates to the standardization of data codes and elements and the protocols for communicating among remote terminals in large networks. Much work is needed to develop a simplified query language and this will require both The USIB/IHC has a central role in data time and money. standardization for the intelligence community per NSCID 1/15, but other responsibilities are assigned to individual agencies as part of a complex set of rules and suggested procedures administered overall by the National Bureau of Standards for the Executive Branch as a whole. The willingness of individual agencies and departments to agree on common data standards is At the present stage of standardization, it is not possible to implement the distributed data base concept in a manner that will now give rapid and efficient service to users. Much greater cooperation among organizations in the intelligence community, including a willingness to devote additional people and dollars to the standards problem, will be required before An IHC report to USIB members significant progress is achieved. is now being drafted.

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Chairman, IHC

ca: IC Staff Chiefs

Exec. Sec., USIB

Chairman, USIB Security Committee

Chairman, USIB COMIREX Approved For Release 2004/03/16: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600130005-4

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Distribution for DCI/IC 75-1512, 24 March 1975:

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The Honorable Albert C. Hall Assistant Secretary (Intelligence) Department of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Al:

I've been thinking about the interagency study of US/Soviet intelligence capabilities and assets we discussed a few weeks ago. I know the work is going forward as "an experiment" but at some point I believe we could profitably discuss the use. I understand the data is not too helpful and there is some concern that we may be trying to do this too quickly. I believe you will agree that we do not want to find ourselves recording a set of numbers and judgments that could prove questionable later. There is virtue in undertaking a deeper inquiry into the capabilities of Soviet technical systems, particularly now.

Sincerely,

/s/ D.

W. E. Colby

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I am recommending that you and Dr. Hall review the bidding on the net assessment study of US/Soviet intelligence capabilities. So far I see: no clear purpose for the study; inherent softness of the data; insufficient time allotted even to assemble properly what data exists, much less coordinate the judgments built on the data; strong reservations by the DDI and in DIA mainly for the reasons above; the need to get in tandem with Carl Duckett's projected study of Soviet technical capabilities.

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REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.